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ARTICLE
THE PURSUIT OF PERFECTION:




In June 2009 the Supreme Court avoided a decision on the
constitutionality of the Voting Rights Act's preclearance
requirement, while at the same time managing to foreshadow
that provision's ultimate demise. In a separate opinion, Justice
Thomas announced that he would have reached the issue and
invalidated the preclearance requirement. Conceding that
unconstitutional racial discrimination in the administration of
elections continued to be an unfortunate reality, he asserted that
Congress was not permitted to pursue "perfect compliance" with
the Constitution's mandate via the use of "broad prophylactic
legislation."
Justice Thomas's statement accurately, though to be sure
rather starkly, expressed an assumption underlying the last
decade of the Court's case law concerning Congress's power to
enforce any of the three Reconstruction Era Amendments. Yet
this previously unchallenged assumption is wrong. To the
contrary, Congress should enjoy extensive remedial authority,
including the power to enact prophylactic legislation, so long as
perfect compliance with the promises of the Reconstruction
* Professor, University of Cincinnati College of Law. For their many helpful
comments and suggestions, I thank Lou Bilionis, Darrell Miller, and Rebecca Zietlow, as
well as all the participants in workshops held at the University of Toledo College of Law
and the University of Kansas School of Law. Thanks also to Taryn Filo and Noah Stacey
for excellent research assistance, and the University of Cincinnati College of Law and the
Harold C. Schott Foundation for financial support. Of course, remaining errors are mine
alone.
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Amendments remains unrealized. Constitutional text, history,
and structure all support this broader view of congressional
authority. When the question of the Voting Rights Act's
preclearance requirement returns to the Court, it should not only
sustain the statutory provision but also use the occasion to set its
case law governing congressional power to enforce the
Reconstruction Amendments on a firmer foundation.
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"Perfect compliance with the Fifteenth Amendment's
substantive command is not now-nor has it ever been-the
yardstick for determining whether Congress has the power to
employ broad prophylactic legislation to enforce that
Amendment."'
I. INTRODUCTION
In Northwest Austin Municipal Utility District v. Holder
(NAMUDNO), the Supreme Court forecast the demise of a
central provision of the justly celebrated Voting Rights Act of
1965.2 The Chief Justice's opinion for the Court acknowledged
1. Nw. Austin Mun. Util. Dist. No. One v. Holder, 129 S. Ct. 2504, 2526 (2009)
(Thomas, J., concurring in the judgment in part and dissenting in part).
2. See id. at 2511-13 (majority opinion) (discussing the "constitutional concerns"
section five of the Voting Rights Act of 1965 raises).
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that the Act's preclearance requirement' could perhaps no longer
be justified given the perception that the States had now
substantially, albeit belatedly, complied with the Fifteenth
Amendment.! Though the majority ultimately deferred the issue,
Justice Thomas announced in his separate opinion that he would
have gone further and invalidated the challenged provision
without delay.'
Both the Chief Justice and Justice Thomas conceded that at
least some persons were still denied the right to vote because of
their race.' But they reasoned that the extent of the
constitutionally prohibited discrimination may now be too limited
to sustain the preclearance remedy.' Both also explicitly placed
the risk of error or uncertainty about the matter on Congress.!
NAMUDNO is only the most recent of nearly a score of
Supreme Court cases decided over the last decade in which the
Court has reasoned that congressional power to enforce the
Reconstruction Amendments via prophylactic legislation ends
with achievement of substantial constitutional compliance.
Indeed, no member of the Rehnquist or Roberts Courts has even
questioned the notion. Disputes have been limited to such issues
as how "substantiality" should be defined and determined.'o But
the Thirteenth, Fourteenth, and Fifteenth Amendments speak in
uncompromising terms and, as the Court is fond of saying in
other contexts, promise rights to the individual, not to groups.
3. See infra notes 16-17 and accompanying text.
4. See Nw. Austin, 129 S. Ct. at 2508-09, 2511 (suggesting that the "exceptional
conditions" justifying the passage of the Voting Rights Act are no longer applicable).
5. Id. at 2519 (Thomas, J., concurring in the judgment in part and dissenting in part).
6. Id. at 2511 (majority opinion); Id. at 2526 (Thomas, J., concurring in the
judgment in part and dissenting in part).
7. Id. at 2511-12 (majority opinion); Id. at 2526 (Thomas, J., concurring in the
judgment in part and dissenting in part).
8. Id. at 2513 (majority opinion); Id. at 2526 (Thomas, J., concurring in the
judgment in part and dissenting in part).
9. See, e.g., Grutter v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 306, 341-42 (2003) (applying the
requirement that "all governmental use of race must have a logical end point" to admissions
programs that consider race as a factor); City of Boerne v. Flores, 521 U.S. 507, 533 (1997)
(stating that the Voting Rights Act would terminate at the request of states in which
substantial voting discrimination had not occurred in the preceding five years); United
States v. Fordice, 505 U.S. 717, 727-28 (1992) (discussing prior decisions that establish "a
State does not discharge its constitutional obligations until it eradicates policies and
practices traceable to its prior de jure dual system that continue to foster segregation").
10. In Grutter, Justices O'Connor, Ginsburg, and Thomas discuss the amount of
discrimination needed to justify prophylactic legislation. See, e.g., 539 U.S. at 341-43; Id.
at 345-46 (Ginsburg, J., concurring); Id. at 351 (Thomas, J., concurring in part and
dissenting in part).
11. See, e.g., Oyama v. California, 332 U.S. 633, 663 (1948) (Murphy, J., concurring)
(stating that the U.S. Constitution requires both state and federal governments to
5812010]1
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Contrary to the assumptions of all the Justices in all the recent
cases, this Essay argues that Congress has broad power under
the Amendments so long as "perfect compliance" remains
unrealized.
This conclusion finds support in the text and historical
circumstances of the Reconstruction Amendments, which accord
Congress at least as much discretion in assessing the gravity of
an admitted social evil as do the enumerated powers found in
Article I, Section 8.12 Current case law, however, constrains
Congress's enforcement powers far more than it does the powers
to regulate interstate commerce, wage war, or tax and spend for
the general welfare." Considerations of relative institutional
competence also argue that the Court should leave to Congress
questions about when enough has been done to make the
promises of the Reconstruction Amendments realities."
Part II of this Essay explores the Court's recent rulings
restricting congressional power to enforce these Amendments,
showing that NAMUDNO is but one of many recent cases
assuming that it is for the Court to determine when admitted
constitutional violations are pervasive or serious enough to
justify a legislative response. The Essay's third Part then sets
forth the affirmative case against this view. Part III also explains
why acknowledging a congressional power to pursue constitutional




Not all parts of the country are considered equal for the
purposes of the Voting Rights Act, which supplies a formula for
identifying jurisdictions subject to more extensive federal
oversight." Absent prior approval by the Attorney General or the
"respect and observe the dignity of each individual"); Shelley v. Kraemer, 334 U.S. 1, 22
(1948) ("The rights created by the first section of the Fourteenth Amendment
are. . . guaranteed to the individual."); Missouri ex. rel. Gaines v. Canada, 305 U.S. 337,
351 (1938) (stating that the equal protection of the laws applies to the individual).
12. Jack M. Balkin, The Reconstruction Power 8-9 (Yale Law Sch. Pub. Law Working
Paper No. 207, 2010), available at http-//ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstractjid=1558749.
13. See id. at 10-13 (comparing Congress's broad Article I, Section 8 powers under
the standard set forth in McCulloch v. Maryland with the narrower enforcement powers
under the Fourteenth Amendment, which are limited by the "congruent and proportional"
test provided in City of Boerne v. Flores).
14. Id. at 21.
15. 42 U.S.C. § 1973b(b) (2006).
582 [ 47:3
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U.S. District Court for the District of Columbia, section 5 of the
Act prohibits covered jurisdictions from changing "any voting
qualification or prerequisite to voting, or standard, practice, or
procedure with respect to voting."" The theory of this
"preclearance" requirement is that litigants, both public and
private, can far more effectively employ the Act's other
substantive sections against a stationary rather than a moving
target.17 By 1965 the need to freeze covered jurisdictions' election
practices was apparent. Prior efforts to realize the promise of the
Fifteenth Amendment had for nearly a century been frustrated
by these jurisdictions' demonstrated ability to circumvent federal
judicial injunctions against discriminatory practices by adopting
new impediments to minority voting too close to an election to
permit full judicial examination.'" The 1965 Act contained a
sunset provision, and Congress has repeatedly extended the Act's
term, most recently for another 25 years in 2006.'9
As a covered jurisdiction, Northwest Austin Municipal
Utility District Number One needed pre-approval for virtually
any changes to the elections used to select its five-member
board.20 In 2008, the utility district filed suit for a declaration
that section 5 no longer applied to it, either because the district
16. Voting Rights Act of 1965, Pub. L. No. 89-110, § 5, 79 Stat. 437, 439 (codified as
amended at 42 U.S.C. § 1973c (2006)).
17. See Beer v. United States, 425 U.S. 130, 140 (1976) (observing that section 5 of
the Voting Rights Act responded to the practice in some jurisdictions to pass "new
discriminatory voting laws as soon as the old ones had been struck down" (internal
quotation marks omitted) (quoting H.R. REP. 94-196, at 57 (1975)).
18. See Nw. Austin Mun. Util. Dist. No. One v. Holder, 129 S. Ct. 2504, 2522-23
(2009) (Thomas, J., concurring in the judgment in part and dissenting in part) (recounting
history leading to 1965 Act).
19. Id. at 2510 (majority opinion). A substantial body of literature moots the specific
question of Congress's power to reauthorize the Voting Rights Act in 2006. See, e.g., Luis
Fuentes-Rohwer, Legislative Findings, Congressional Powers, and the Future of the
Voting Rights Act, 82 IND. L.J. 99, 130 (2007) (arguing that the Court may declare a
permanent preclearance provision unconstitutional "[i]f the federalism revolution has any
traction"); Samuel Issacharoff, Is Section 5 of the Voting Rights Act a Victim of Its Own
Success?, 104 COLUM. L. REV. 1710, 1728-31 (2004) (arguing that section 5 of the Voting
Rights Act is now defunct in light of the modern political scheme); Nathaniel Persily, The
Promise and Pitfalls of the New Voting Rights Act, 117 YALE L.J. 174, 192-94 (2007)
(discussing the difficulties supporters of the Act face under the new constitutional
standard established in City of Boerne v. Flores). But see Richard L. Hasen, Congressional
Power to Renew the Preclearance Provisions of the Voting Rights Act After Tennessee v.
Lane, 66 OHIO ST. L.J. 177, 199-202 (2005) (arguing that the Court is not likely to
succumb to the federalism revolution and declare the preclearance provision
unconstitutional); Pamela S. Karlan, Section 5 Squared: Congressional Power to Extend
and Amend the Voting Rights Act, 44 Hous. L. REV. 1, 16-19 (2007) (discussing the factors
that indicate "congressional power is at its apogee" with regards to the preclearance
provision).
20. Nw. Austin, 129 S. Ct. at 2508, 2510.
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qualified for exemption under the Act's "bailout" provision or
because, as applied, section 5 was unconstitutional.2'
A three-judge district court22 ruled that the utility district
was not a "political subdivision" eligible for a bailout, but on
direct appeal the Supreme Court unanimously disagreed.23
According to eight of the nine Justices, the utility district's
victory on its statutory argument mooted its constitutional
claim.24 Chief Justice Roberts stressed that this course honored
the "well-established principle governing the prudent exercise of
th[e] Court's jurisdiction that normally the Court will not decide
a constitutional question if there is some other ground upon
which to dispose of the case."25 At several points in his opinion,
the Chief Justice expressed the Justices' collective relief at
deferring resolution of such a "difficult" constitutional issue as
the validity of this key provision of the Voting Rights Act.26
Justice Thomas, however, was impatient with the delay. In
his view, a ruling that the utility district qualified under the
Act's bailout section simply did not accord it the same sweeping
and ultimate relief as would a ruling that it was constitutionally
exempt from the preclearance requirement.2 7 Accordingly, Justice
Thomas addressed the constitutional question on the merits.
For him, section 5 had overstayed its constitutional
invitation, in part because it had from the outset been something
of an unwelcome visitor.2 8 Of course, the Constitution limited the
federal government to its enumerated powers." Moreover,
alluding to the Rehnquist Court's States Qua States rulings,"o
21. Id. at 2510.
22. See Michael E. Solimine, Congress, Ex Parte Young, and the Fate of the
Three-Judge District Court, 70 U. PITT. L. REV. 101, 132-33 (2008) (discussing the Voting
Rights Act's use of the three-judge district court).
23. Nw. Austin, 129 S. Ct. at 2510, 2516. But see generally Richard L. Hasen,
Constitutional Avoidance and Anti-Avoidance at the Roberts Court, 2011 SUP. CT. REV.
(forthcoming 2011) (doubting the validity of the Supreme Court's interpretation of the
relevant statutory provision); Ellen D. Katz, From Bush v. Gore to NAMUDNO: A
Response to Professor Amar, 61 Fla. L. Rev. 991 (2009) (same). For an argument that the
bailout procedure should be revised and liberalized, see Christopher B. Seaman, An
Uncertain Future for Section 5 of the Voting Rights Act: The Need for a Revised Bailout
System, 30 ST. LOUIS U. PUB. L. REV. (forthcoming 2011).
24. Nw. Austin, 129 S. Ct. at 2513.
25. Id. (quoting Escambia Cnty. v. McMillan, 466 U.S. 48, 51 (1984)).
26. Id. at 2508, 2513, 2516.
27. Id. at 2517-18 (Thomas, J., concurring in the judgment in part and dissenting
in part).
28. Id. at 2524.
29. Id. at 2519.
30. Id. at 2519-20. Justice Thomas cites Gregory v. Ashcroft, 501 U.S. 452, 461-62
(1991) and Alden v. Maine, 527 U.S. 706, 713 (1999), but these cases were two of a series.
584 [47:3
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Justice Thomas protested that section 5 exacted especially severe
"federalism costs" because it intruded upon the very workings of
state and local government: "State autonomy with respect to the
machinery of self-government defines the States as sovereign
entities rather than mere provincial outposts subject to every
dictate of a central governing authority.""' He conceded that the
Fifteenth Amendment limited state autonomy over elections.32
But in his view, the Fifteenth Amendment thereby created a
clash of conflicting constitutional values, and it fell to the Court
to mediate this tension by carefully examining "any measure
enacted in furtherance of the Fifteenth Amendment ... to ensure
that its encroachment on state authority in this area is limited to
the appropriate enforcement" of the Amendment's ban on
purposeful discrimination."
In light of this judicial imperative, the preclearance
requirement of the Voting Rights Act was, even in 1965, strong
medicine pushing the outer boundaries of congressional
enforcement authority. The Warren Court's decision to sustain
the provision was explainable only by reference to the egregious
circumstances Congress had then confronted and dutifully
documented in the formal legislative record.34 As Justice Thomas
noted, the Court had explicitly invoked that record in South
Carolina v. Katzenbach," from which he inferred that such a
record was necessary to the constitutionality of a measure as
suspect as section 5." Justice Thomas stressed the depth and
See THOMAS B. MCAFFEE, JAY S. BYBEE & A. CHRISTOPHER BRYANT, POWERS RESERVED
FOR THE PEOPLE AND THE STATES: A HISTORY OF THE NINTH AND TENTH AMENDMENTS
179-88 (2006) (discussing the history of the States Qua States rulings).
31. Nw. Austin, 129 S. Ct. at 2519-20 (Thomas, J., concurring in the judgment in
part and dissenting in part) (citing U.S. CONST. amend. X).
32. Id. at 2520.
33. Id. Subsequent passages in Justice Thomas's opinion suggest that the other
Reconstruction Amendments similarly invite the Court to set the proper balance between
their aims and the values of federalism. Id. at 2524-25 (stating that prophylactic
legislation enforcing the Reconstruction Amendments must both identify the
transgressing conduct and tailor the remedy for that conduct).
34. Id. at 2523. But see Rebecca E. Zietlow, The Judicial Restraint of the Warren
Court (and Why It Matters), 69 OHIO ST. L.J. 255, 279-82 (2008) (emphasizing the Warren
Court's deference to Congress in its Voting Rights Act decisions).
35. Nw. Austin, 129 S. Ct. at 2526 (Thomas, J., concurring in the judgment in part
and dissenting in part); South Carolina v. Katzenbach, 383 U.S. 301, 328-36 (1966).
36. See Nw. Austin, 129 S. Ct. at 2523 (Thomas, J., concurring in the judgment in
part and dissenting in part) (arguing that the Katzenbach Court closely reviewed the
Congressional Record before determining extreme circumstances existed to warrant the
breadth of section 5). But see A. Christopher Bryant & Timothy J. Simeone, Remanding to
Congress: The Supreme Court's New "On the Record" Constitutional Review of Federal
Statutes, 86 CORNELL L. REV. 328, 363-67 (2001) (noting the Court's clarification in
Katzenbach that "an exercise of congressional authority to enforce the Reconstruction
2010] 585
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violence of the opposition to effective black suffrage during and in
the decades following Reconstruction. The undeniable progress
of the intervening forty years since the Act was adopted put the
burden of proving the continuing need squarely on the 109th
Congress-a burden that Congress had, in his view, failed to
carry." Given "the lack of current evidence of intentional
discrimination with respect to voting," section 5 could "no longer
be justified as an appropriate mechanism for enforcement of the
Fifteenth Amendment."39
Though passages in Justice Thomas's opinion might be read
to suggest that this perceived failure by Congress to produce
supporting evidence in the formal legislative record was itself
sufficient to render the renewal of the preclearance requirement
unconstitutional, he did not rest his case on that point alone.
Rather, he asserted affirmatively that "the Fifteenth
Amendment's promise of full enfranchisement" had in fact been
substantially fulfilled."o In support of this bold and reassuring
claim, Justice Thomas cited a single statistical metric: by 2006,
the disparity in voter registration rates between the black and
white populations in covered jurisdictions, which had been so
pronounced in 1965, had "nearly vanished."1 Justice Thomas
rejected the possibility that this progress might be reversed in
the absence of a preclearance requirement on the ground that
such a fear was "premised on outdated assumptions about racial
attitudes in the covered jurisdictions."42 Similarly, he dismissed
Amendments required neither formal findings of fact nor evidentiary support in the
legislative record" (citing Katzenbach v. Morgan, 384 U.S. 641, 653 (1966))); Archibald
Cox, Foreword: Constitutional Adjudication and the Promotion of Human Rights, 80
HARv. L. REV. 91, 105 (1966) ("The Court does not review the sufficiency of the evidence in
the [legislative] record to support congressional action.... [T]he practice of relying upon the
legislative record when it exists should not be taken to show that such a record is required.").
37. Nw. Austin, 129 S. Ct. at 2521-22 (Thomas, J., concurring in the judgment in
part and dissenting in part).
38. Id. at 2526-27.
39. Id. at 2519.
40. Id. at 2527; see also id. at 2525 (arguing that finding section 5 constitutionally
insufficient "is not a sign of defeat," but rather "an acknowledgement of victory"). But see
Stephen Ansolabehere, Nathaniel Persily & Charles Stewart III, Race, Region, and Vote
Choice in the 2008 Election: Implications for the Future of the Voting Rights Act, 123
HARv. L. REV. 1385, 1435 (2010) (concluding that "Barack Obama's higher vote share
among minorities and his uneven performance among whites suggest" a continuation of
the racially polarized voting that gave rise to the Voting Rights Act, though
acknowledging that data from the 2008 election might support revisions to the list of
covered jurisdictions).
41. Nw. Austin, 129 S. Ct. at 2525 (Thomas, J., concurring in the judgment in part
and dissenting in part). Indeed, in one state, Mississippi, "black voter registration
actually exceeded white voter registration." Id.
42. Id.
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the barriers to full and equal minority participation in voting
cited by the 109th Congress as either altogether inapposite to the
purpose of the Fifteenth Amendment or insufficiently comparable
to "the record initially supporting [section] 5," which had gone
from being more than constitutionally sufficient to being
constitutionally necessary.4
Remarkably, Justice Thomas conceded that unconstitutional
"voter discrimination is [not] extinct," but nevertheless deemed the
breadth and frequency of the unconstitutional discrimination to be
too insignificant to authorize the use of such tools as the Voting
Rights Act's preclearance requirement." Congressional power to
"employ broad prophylactic legislation" did not extend to achieving
"[perfect compliance with the Fifteenth Amendment's substantive
command."" Apparently what Justice Thomas characterized as
"scattered infringement of the right to vote" would simply have to
be tolerated." Without perceptible awareness of the irony, Justice
Thomas, in the next sentence of his opinion, observed "the
Fifteenth Amendment was ratified in order to guarantee that no
citizen would be denied the right to vote based on race." Insofar
as those persons subject to the acknowledged "scattered
infringement of the right to vote" were concerned, the Constitution
could promise, but Congress could not deliver.
B. Recent Authority
It would be unfair to place the blame for this miserly
interpretation of Congress's enforcement authority on Justice
Thomas alone. In his defense, his approach is the logical
consequence of the Court's most recent relevant rulings. The Court
first jumped the rails in its 7-2 decision in City of Boerne v. Flores."
There, the Supreme Court invalidated the Religious
Freedom Restoration Act (RFRA) as beyond Congress's power
under Section 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment." As RFRA's title
43. Id. at 2526.
44. Id.
45. Id.
46. Id. at 2526-27.
47. Id. at 2527 (emphasis added).
48. City of Boerne v. Flores, 521 U.S. 507 (1997).
49. Id. at 536. Section 1 of the Fourteenth Amendment provides, in pertinent part:
No State shall make or enforce any law which shall abridge the privileges or
immunities of citizens of the United States; nor shall any State deprive any
person of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law; nor deny to any
person within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws.
U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1. Section 5 states: 'The Congress shall have power to enforce,
by appropriate legislation, the provisions of this article." Id. § 5. RFRA's defenders argued
5872010]1
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suggests, Congress had intended the Act to restore the practice of
subjecting to the strictest judicial scrutiny laws of general
applicability having the incidental effect of imposing a
substantial burden on the free exercise of religion.o The Supreme
Court's 1990 decision in Employment Division v. Smith had
found this practice to be unnecessary under the Free Exercise
Clause of the First Amendment."
Congress had expressly invoked its power under Section 5 of
the Fourteenth Amendment, and the government defended
RFRA in the Supreme Court with two quite distinct-indeed,
potentially incompatible-theories to justify the statute, only the
second of which is of direct relevance here.52 Specifically, the
government maintained that RFRA could be upheld as a
prophylactic rule designed to enforce the Free Exercise Clause as
the Court had construed it in Smith." On this theory, by
requiring heightened judicial review of all laws that have the
effect of substantially burdening religious practice, RFRA would
increase the likelihood that the courts would identify and strike
down those facially neutral laws enacted for the concededly
constitutionally impermissible purpose of discouraging or
prohibiting disfavored religious exercise. The rationale for such a
prophylactic rule would be that at least some facially neutral
laws might be motivated by such a hidden unconstitutional
intent to discriminate against religious practices.
that the Act "enforce[d]" Section 1's guarantee of "due process of law" given that the
phrase had been interpreted to incorporate the First Amendment's Free Exercise Clause.
See Flores, 521 U.S. at 517, 519. See generally Kent Greenawalt, Quo Vadis: The Status
and Prospects of "Tests" Under the Religion Clauses, 1995 SUP. CT. REV. 323, 345-46,
348-50 (arguing that Congress "has the power to interpret rights in order to expand them
beyond what the Court has concluded the Constitution grants"); Ronald D. Rotunda, The
Powers of Congress Under Section 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment After City of Boerne v.
Flores, 32 IND. L. REV. 163, 173-74 (1998) (discussing the theory that section 5 conferred
broad power on Congress to define rights); Steven A. Engel, Note, The McCulloch Theory
of the Fourteenth Amendment: City of Boerne v. Flores and the Original Understanding of
Section 5, 109 YALE L.J. 115 (1999) (arguing that the Framers of the Fourteenth
Amendment intended for Congress to have primary enforcement power).
50. Flores, 521 U.S. at 515.
51. Id. at 512-15 (discussing Employment Div. v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872 (1990) and
the preamble to RFRA).
52. For a discussion of the first theory, see infra notes 180-82 and accompanying text.
53. Flores, 521 U.S. at 517.
54. See id. (discussing the respondent's argument that congressional focus on the
law's discriminatory effect accords with Congress's power to prevent and remedy
constitutional violations); see also Church of the Lukumi Babalu Aye, Inc. v. Hialeah, 508
U.S. 520, 542 (1993) (finding ordinances were constructed to suppress specific religious
practices); Brief of Respondent Flores at 29-30, City of Boerne v. Flores, 521 U.S. 507
(1997) (No. 95-2074) (noting that facially neutral laws can be motivated by an intent to
discriminate); Brief for the United States at 33, City of Boerne v. Flores, 521 U.S. 507
(1997) (No. 95-2074) (same).
[ 47:3588
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In rejecting this second rationale, Justice Kennedy's opinion
for the Court strongly implied that intentional discrimination
against minority religions was simply not a serious enough
problem to justify the prophylactic remedy Congress had enacted.
Justice Kennedy acknowledged that "preventive rules are
sometimes appropriate," and that "[1]egislation which deters or
remedies constitutional violations can fall within the sweep of
Congress' enforcement power even if in the process it prohibits
conduct which is not itself unconstitutional and intrudes into
'legislative spheres of autonomy previously reserved to the
States.""' Nevertheless, the constitutionality of such prophylactic
rules "must be considered in light of the evil presented." Justice
Kennedy dismissed as misplaced the government's reliance on
prior decisions of the Court-such as Fullilove v. Klutznick" or
City of Rome v. United States"-which had sustained congressional
prohibitions of governmental actions with discriminatory effects.
The Court had done so on the ground that the prohibitions were
a permissible, albeit overbroad, means to preclude the subset
thereof actually infected with an unconstitutional intent to
discriminate on the basis of race." The analogy to RFRA failed,
Justice Kennedy reasoned, because racial discrimination was
simply a more substantial problem than religious discrimination:
"Strong measures appropriate to address one harm may be an
unwarranted response to another, lesser one."
The Justices' judgment that racial bigotry was by 1997 a
comparatively greater national evil than religious bigotry no
doubt struck most readers as reasonable. And Congress had
made it all too clear that its actual intent in enacting RFRA was
not to honor but rather to overturn the Court's narrowing of the
scope of the Free Exercise guarantee in Employment Division v.
Smith.6 1 But it nonetheless merits asking how are the Justices to
know the present reality about such a matter, especially when
confronted with a contrary determination by the U.S. Congress?
Similar questions are raised by the Court's more recent
Eleventh Amendment decisions. In Florida Prepaid
Postsecondary Education Expense Board v. College Savings
Bank, the Court considered whether Congress's attempt to
55. Flores, 521 U.S. at 518, 530 (quoting Fitzpatrick v. Bitzer, 427 U.S. 445, 455 (1976)).
56. Id. at 530.
57. Fullilove v. Klutznick, 448 U.S. 448, 478 (1980) (plurality opinion).
58. City of Rome v. United States, 446 U.S. 156, 177 (1980).
59. Id; Fullilove, 448 U.S. at 476-78.
60. Flores, 521 U.S. at 530.
61. Id. at 512, 515.
2010]1 589
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empower federal courts to entertain patent-enforcement actions
against states constituted a legitimate exercise of Congress's
Section 5 power to enforce the Fourteenth Amendment.62 The
Court conceded that a State violated the Amendment's first
section when it both infringed a patent and failed to provide an
adequate process of redress.63 Nevertheless, the Court struck
down the state-suit provision because the legislative record failed
to document a sufficient "history of 'widespread and persisting
deprivation of constitutional rights."" The Court observed that
Congress had "identified no pattern of patent infringement by the
States"-no "massive or widespread violation of patent laws by
the States" such as would constitute "evidence that unremedied
patent infringement by States had become a problem of national
import."'
Significantly, whereas Flores could be understood as the
Court's response to Congress's fairly transparent non-acquiescence
in the Smith decision, Florida Prepaid could not be so easily
limited. Congress had enacted the Patent Remedy Act before the
Court held, in Seminole Tribe, that Congress may not abrogate
state sovereign immunity pursuant to its Article I powers.66
Flores might have been confined to instances in which Congress
apparently attempted to exercise its Section 5 power to alter,
rather than enforce, the Court's interpretation of the
Constitution. But Florida Prepaid indicated that the Court would
second-guess Congress's judgment about the congruence and
proportionality of a remedial scheme whenever it seeks to
exercise its authority to enforce the Fourteenth Amendment or,
presumably, any of the Reconstruction Amendments.
62. Fla. Prepaid Postsecondary Educ. Expense Bd. v. Coll. Say. Bank, 527 U.S. 627,
647-48 (1999). Given the Constitution's express grant of authority to Congress over
patents, U.S. CONsT. art. I, § 8, cl. 8, the question raised in Florida Prepaid would have
been entirely academic three years earlier. The Court's decision in Seminole Tribe of
Florida v. Florida, 517 U.S. 44, 72-73 (1996), however, made "clear that Congress may not
abrogate state sovereign immunity pursuant to its Article I powers[,I" but may do so when
enforcing the Fourteenth Amendment. Fla. Prepaid, 527 U.S. at 636-37. Thus, the Seminole
Tribe decision rendered dispositive the question presented in Florida Prepaid-whether
provision of a federal court remedy in cases of patent infringement by the states
constituted "appropriate" remedial or preventive legislation enforcing the Fourteenth
Amendment's Due Process Clause. Id. at 636.
63. Fla. Prepaid, 527 U.S. at 640-43.
64. Id. at 630, 645 (quoting Flores, 521 U.S. at 526).
65. Id. at 640-41 (emphasis added) (citations omitted) (internal quotation marks
omitted). The Court dismissed as "speculative" testimony that state patent infringement
would likely increase significantly as state universities increasingly engaged in the
development of marketable technologies. Id. at 641. But see id. at 656-57 (Stevens, J.,
dissenting) (criticizing the majority for dismissing the testimony as "speculative").
66. Id. at 636 (majority opinion).
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In short order, the Court entrenched its superintending role
by invalidating the state-suit provisions of first the Age
Discrimination in Employment Act67 and then the Americans
with Disabilities Act.68 In each case, the Court supplanted
Congress's assessment of the likelihood, frequency, and
seriousness of the states' violations of the rights the Acts
protected with its own, more forgiving, one. Implicit in each
ruling was the assumption that Congress was precluded from
employing prophylactic remedies for, and thus was effectively
obliged to tolerate, some supposedly de minimus level of
constitutional rights violations. Moreover, the Court would
decide whether the existing state of affairs did or did not rise to
the level authorizing Congress to employ prophylactic remedies.
How were the Justices to make these kinds of
determinations? Nevada Department of Human Resources v.
Hibbso suggests an answer, albeit one normatively indefensible.
There the Court sustained the provisions of the Family Medical
Leave Act (FMLA) that authorized private suits against states.n
Nevada argued that those provisions violated the State's
sovereign immunity-a plausible claim, to say the least." In the
six years preceding the argument in Hibbs, the Court had
invalidated the state-suit provisions of six federal statutes."
Indeed, two federal courts of appeals had struck down the
specific provision of the FMLA at issue in Hibbs by the time the
case was argued before the Supreme Court.74 But to the surprise
of many, 7 Hibbs proved to be the end of the states' long train of
67. Kimel v. Fla. Bd. of Regents, 528 U.S. 62, 67 (2000).
68. Bd. of Trs. of Univ. of Ala. v. Garrett, 531 U.S. 356, 374 (2001).
69. See Garrett, 531 U.S. at 370-72 (noting the "legislative record of the ADA" failed
to show Congress had identified a "pattern of irrational state discrimination in
employment against the disabled"); Kimel, 528 U.S. at 82-91 (finding "Congress had
virtually no reason to believe" state or local governments unconstitutionally discriminated
against employees based on age).
70. Nev. Dep't of Human Res. v. Hibbs, 538 U.S. 721 (2003).
71. Id. at 724-25.
72. Id. at 741 (Stevens, J., concurring in judgment).
73. See, e.g., Garrett, 531 U.S. at 374 (Americans with Disabilities Act); Kimel, 528
U.S. at 91 (Age Discrimination in Employment Act); Alden v. Maine, 527 U.S. 706, 712
(1999) (Fair Labor Standards Act of 1938); Coll. Say. Bank v. Fla. Prepaid Postsecondary
Educ. Expense Bd., 527 U.S. 666, 680, 687 (1999) (Trademark Remedy Clarification Act);
Fla. Prepaid Postsecondary Educ. Expense Bd. v. Coll. Say. Bank, 527 U.S. 627, 647-48
(1999) (Patent Remedy Act); Seminole Tribe of Fla. v. Fla., 517 U.S. 44, 47, 53 (1996)
(Indian Gaming Regulatory Act).
74. Kazmier v. Widmann, 225 F.3d 519, 526-27, 529 (5th Cir. 2000); Thomson v.
Ohio State Univ. Hosp., 238 F.3d 424, No. 98-3613, 2000 WL 1721038, at *2-3 (6th Cir.
Nov. 8, 2000) (per curiam).
75. See, e.g., Robert C. Post, Foreword: Fashioning the Legal Constitution: Culture,
Courts, and Law, 117 HARV. L. REV. 4, 14-15 (2003) ("The holding [in Hibbs] was
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victories in sovereign immunity cases." Three Justices dissented,
saying among other things that the FMLA could not be
meaningfully distinguished from the six laws the Court had
recently ruled unconstitutional." So the focus of the majority
opinion by Chief Justice Rehnquist, who along with Justice
O'Connor had joined in the majority opinions in the previous
cases, was on what made the FMLA different.
Justice Rehnquist's effort to distinguish the prior cases was
less than compelling. First, he characterized the substantive
provisions of the FMLA as a remedy for sex discrimination"-a
fairly debatable conclusion given that the Act created an entitlement
to, at a minimum, 12 weeks of unpaid, family-emergency leave for
all covered employees regardless of sex." Even more questionable
was the Chief Justice's reliance on data about the private sector
as evidence of a pattern of governmental discrimination in the
administration of leave policies."o In prior state sovereign
immunity cases, the Court had deemed irrelevant evidence of
private sector patent infringement, age discrimination, and
failure to accommodate disabilities, stressing that only evidence
of state governmental misconduct could empower Congress to
authorize suit against the States."'
unanticipated, because in the years since [Flores] the Court had invalidated every
exercise of Section 5 power that it had confronted."); Reva B. Siegel, You've Come A Long
Way, Baby: Rehnquist's New Approach to Pregnancy Discrimination in Hibbs, 58 STAN. L.
REV. 1871, 1872-73 (2006) (citation omitted) ("Any reader of [the} early Rehnquist sex
discrimination opinions, or Rehnquist's more recent opinions restricting Congress's power
to enforce the Fourteenth Amendment, surely would not have predicted that he would
conclude his time on the bench writing a pathbreaking opinion upholding provisions of the
Family and Medical Leave Act .. . as a valid exercise of Congress's Section 5 power.").
76. See Hibbs, 538 U.S. at 724-25, 738 (upholding the FMLA's state-suit provision).
77. Id. at 744-46 (Kennedy, J., dissenting).
78. Id. at 728, 736 (majority opinion). See Siegel, supra note 75, at 1882, 1884-90
("[C]ritics found the Hibbs decision itself hard to reconcile with the Court's earlier Section 5
cases.").
79. Hibbs, 538 U.S. at 737.
80. Id. at 730. To be sure, as Rehnquist observed, two sources in the entirety of the
Act's near decade-long history asserted that with respect to leave policies the public and
private sectors were not significantly different. Id. at 730 n.3, 731. But these isolated
claims concerning the state of affairs seven years before the FMLA was enacted provided
a rather attenuated basis for abrogating state sovereign immunity under the Court's
relevant precedents. Id. at 747, 753 (Kennedy, J., dissenting).
81. See Bd. of Trs. of Univ. of Ala. v. Garrett, 531 U.S. 356, 368-72 (2001) (stating that
congressional findings of disability discrimination in private sector employment were
inapposite as to whether state governments acting as employers unconstitutionally
discriminated); Kimel v. Fla. Bd. of Regents, 528 U.S. 62, 90 (2000) (stressing congressional
finding of substantial age discrimination in the private sector was "beside the point," and that
Congress had failed to make such findings with regards to the states); Fla. Prepaid
Postsecondary Educ. Expense Bd. v. Coll. Say. Bank, 527 U.S. 627, 640-41 (1999) (noting
Congress's failure to document a pattern of patent infringement by the states).
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So, understandably puzzled commentators speculated aloud
as to what explained Chief Justice Rehnquist's more indulgent
approach in Hibbs.82 Several argued that his otherwise
perplexing embrace of the arguments in support of the FMLA
were rooted in his personal experience of the needs the Act was
meant to address." His wife died after an extended struggle with
cancer, and his daughter, a single mother whose career as an
attorney had been placed in jeopardy by her extensive use of
leave, had frequently relied upon him to provide child care,
causing him to leave the Court early in the day several times
during the very term in which Hibbs was argued and decided.8 4
Whether these experiences affected his analysis of the arguments
made in support of the FMLA we will probably never know
(likely he was himself unaware of the subtle ways in which his
experiences had framed his perception of the FMLA). In any
event, the sequence of events supplies a cogent narrative
explaining a curious development in Chief Justice Rehnquist's
jurisprudence." This explanation fits well with a radically realist
vision of law as almost infinitely malleable and judging as just
another mode of policymaking. Indeed, few if any would deny
that a judge's life experience shapes her jurisprudence, and most
would likely conclude that it should do so.
But reliance upon the life experience of the Justices to
supply sound assessments concerning the existence or extent of a
social evil places a colossal weight on a slender reed. The
comparative advantage of legislators in making these judgments
is enormous. In addition to the vastly superior ability of
legislators to educate themselves about such matters through use
of a wide-ranging inquisitorial process, the Justices are in no
manner representative of the nation's populace.86 Hence, one can
expect an incalculable range of the American experience to lie
beyond their familiarity.
82. Siegel, supra note 75, at 1882.
83. See, e.g., id. (discussing "Rehnquist's own family circumstances" that may have
contributed to his sympathy for the statute). But see Post, supra note 75, at 14-15, 18-22
(discussing how the Flores holding was unanticipated and suggesting that Rehnquist may
have written the opinion to "avoid a major constitutional controversy over the
constitutional status of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964").
84. Siegel, supra note 75, at 1882-83.
85. See id. at 1883 ("[Chief Justice Rehnquist's] experience might have made him
more responsive to arguments advanced by the FMLA's advocates and, perhaps, by other
Justices who negotiated work-family conflicts in their own careers.").
86. See W.F. WILLOUGHBY, PRINCIPLES OF JUDICIAL ADMINISTRATION 356 (1929)
(quoting President Taft's message to Congress explaining his decision to veto the
admittance of Arizona and New Mexico as states because their constitutions failed to
"adequately ... protect the independence of judges").
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In any event, even assuming that a judicial assessment of
the extent and gravity of present social evils is to be preferred to
a legislative one, the question remains: don't the Reconstruction
Amendments, fairly construed, authorize Congress to remedy
even rare and isolated denials of individual constitutional rights?
III. THE POWER TO PURSUE PERFECTION
The answer to such a question must be distilled from an
analysis of the text of the Reconstruction Amendments, their
history, the construction that the Court has given Congress's
other enumerated powers, and considerations of the relative
institutional capacities of Congress and the federal judiciary.
Each of these factors counsels an answer in the affirmative.
A. Text
Any inquiry into constitutional meaning must begin with a
close study of the relevant text, which here includes both the
substantive and the enforcement provisions of the Reconstruction
Amendments.
1. Substantive Commands. The scope of the enforcement
sections derives from the substantive promises the Amendments
make, as it is those promises that Congress has been empowered
to realize." And the Constitution makes those promises to
individuals."
The Thirteenth Amendment's prohibition on slavery is
all-encompassing and absolute. In similar fashion, after decreeing
that "[alll persons born or naturalized in the United States" are
citizens, Section 1 of the Fourteenth Amendment bars any State
from depriving "any person of life, liberty, or property, without
due process of law" or denying "any person within its jurisdiction
87. See William M. Carter, Jr., A Thirteenth Amendment Framework for Combating
Racial Profiling, 39 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 17, 83-84 (2004) (explaining that Congress's
enforcement power "under the Reconstruction Amendments must be tied to
enforcing ... the substantive provisions of those amendments").
88. See Shelley v. Kraemer, 334 U.S. 1, 22 (1948) ("The rights created by the first
section of the Fourteenth Amendment are . .. guaranteed to the individual.").
89. U.S. CONST. amend. XIII. Similarly sweeping is the inferred authority to
eliminate "all badges and incidents of slavery." See, e.g., Jones v. Alfred H. Mayer Co.,
392 U.S. 409, 439 (1968) (internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting Civil Rights
Cases, 109 U.S. 3, 20 (1883)). See generally Darrell A.H. Miller, White Cartels, The Civil
Rights Act of 1866, and the History of Jones v. Alfred H. Mayer Co., 77 FORDHAM L.
REV. 999 (2008) (discussing the importance of Jones v. Alfred H. Mayer Co. to the
Thirteenth Amendment); Lea VanderVelde, The Thirteenth Amendment of Our
Aspirations, 38 U. TOL. L. REV. 855 (2007) (sketching a broad interpretation of the
Thirteenth Amendment).
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the equal protection of the laws.""o So too, the Fifteenth
Amendment's edict that the "right of citizens ... to vote shall not
be denied or abridged ... on account of race" admits of no
exceptions."
In the Fourteenth Amendment context in particular, the
Court has in recent decades been at great pains to distinguish
between individuals' rights, which the Amendment protects, and
group rights, which the Court insists the Amendment does not
recognize. Most recently, in Parents Involved in Community
Schools v. Seattle School District No. 1, Chief Justice Roberts,
writing for a four-Justice plurality, observed that "our
precedent ... makes clear that the Equal Protection Clause
'protect[s] persons, not groups."'9 2 To be sure, this understanding
of the equal protection guarantee has been criticized both on"3
and off" the Court. But a majority of the sitting Justices,
including most emphatically Justice Thomas, have embraced this
individual rights reading repeatedly in the context of a
constitutional skepticism of governmental affirmative action
90. U.S. CONsT. amend. XIV (emphases added). The Chase Court reduced the
Amendment's guarantee of the privileges or immunities of citizens of the United States to
an irrelevancy. See Slaughter-House Cases, 83 U.S. (16 Wall.) 36, 73-74 (1872)
(distinguishing between citizenship of the United States and of the individual States); see
also John Harrison, Reconstructing the Privileges or Immunities Clause, 101 YALE L.J.
1385, 1414 (1992) (stating that the Slaughter-House Cases "effectively banished" the
clause from the Constitution). For recent discussion of the historical context of the
Fourteenth Amendment generally and the privileges or immunities clause in particular,
see Richard L. Aynes, The 39th Congress (1865-1867) and the 14th Amendment: Some
Preliminary Perspectives, 42 AKRON L. REV. 1019, 1040-45 (2009) and Richard L. Aynes,
Ink Blot or Not: The Meaning of Privileges and/or Immunities, 11 U. PA. J. CONST. L.
1295, 1296-304 (2009).
91. U.S. CONsT. amend. XV.
92. Parents Involved in Cmty. Sch. v. Seattle Sch. Dist. No. 1, 551 U.S. 701, 743
(2007) (plurality opinion) (alteration in original) (quoting Adarand Constructors, Inc. v.
Pena, 515 U.S. 200, 227 (1995)).
93. See, e.g., Adarand Constructors, Inc. v. Pena, 515 U.S. 200, 243 (1995)
(Stevens, J., dissenting) ("There is no moral or constitutional equivalence between a
policy that is designed to perpetuate a caste system and one that seeks to eradicate
racial subordination. Invidious discrimination is an engine of oppression, subjugating
a disfavored group to enhance or maintain the power of the majority." (emphasis
added)).
94. For the now classic exposition of the view that the Equal Protection Clause
ought to be interpreted to protect groups from long-term subordination, see Owen M. Fiss,
Groups and the Equal Protection Clause, 5 PHIL & PUB. AFF. 107, 147 (1976). See also
Daniel Farber & Suzanna Sherry, The Pariah Principle, 13 CONsT. COMMENT. 257, 266-67
(1996) (stating that the Equal Protection Clause means the government cannot pass
legislation creating or sanctioning outcast groups); Cass R. Sunstein, The Anticaste
Principle, 92 MICH. L. REV. 2410, 2428-30, 2439-41 (1994) (proposing that the Fourteenth
Amendment was originally "an effort to eliminate racial caste"); Timothy Zick, Angry
White Males: The Equal Protection Clause and "Classes of One," 89 KY. L.J. 69, 96-98
(2000) (providing overview of the scholarly debate).
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programs." Why ought the Court enjoy the power, indeed have
the duty, to remedy even isolated violations of the individual
constitutional rights of persons arguably disadvantaged by such
programs while Congress is obliged to acquiesce in some level of
state denial of constitutional rights of the very class of persons
all agree were the primary intended beneficiaries of the
Amendment?
2. Enforcement Authority. The Reconstruction
Amendments were the first to include separate, express
authorization for Congress to enforce their substantive
commands." To be sure, these were the first amendments to the
U.S. Constitution to enlarge federal power." Still, the explicit
conferral of enforcement authority is remarkable because it was
not only unprecedented but also arguably superfluous. Article I,
Section 8 already empowered Congress to "make all Laws which
shall be necessary and proper for carrying into Execution . .. all
other Powers vested by this Constitution in the Government of
the United States."8 The Enforcement Clauses were added to the
Reconstruction Amendments to foreclose any ambiguity on this
score by placing congressional authority on an unassailable
foundation." Although the reason the Framers substituted
95. See Parents Involved, 551 U.S. at 707, 743 (explaining that the Equal Protection
Clause is designed to protect individual rights in a plurality opinion written by Chief
Justice Roberts and joined by Justices Scalia, Thomas, and Alito); Adarand, 515 U.S. at
202-03, 227 (providing similar analysis in an opinion authored by Justice O'Connor and
joined by Chief Justice Rehnquist and Justices Kennedy, Thomas, and Scalia); see, e.g.,
Missouri v. Jenkins, 515 U.S. 70, 120-21 (1995) (Thomas, J., concurring) (criticizing the
interpretation of the Equal Protection Clause applied in Brown v. Board of Education).
96. See Malla Pollack, Dealing with Old Father William, or Moving from
Constitutional Text to Constitutional Doctrine: Progress Clause Review of the Copyright
Term Extension Act, 36 LOY. L.A. L. REV. 337, 346 (2002) (discussing the types of limits
that can be placed on constitutional powers).
97. See Rayne L. Hammond, Comment, Trial and Tribulation: The Story of United
States v. Anthony, 48 BUFF. L. REv. 981, 997-98 (2000) (stating that with "the passage of
Reconstruction Amendments .. . the federal government ... proclaimed Congress' power
to expand upon and enforce its privileges").
98. U.S. CONsT. art. I, § 8, cl. 18. See Wilson R. Huhn, Congress Has the Power to
Enforce the Bill of Rights Against the Federal Government; Therefore FISA Is Constitutional
and the President's Terrorist Surveillance Program Is Illegal, 16 WM. & MARY BILL RTS. J.
537, 545-48 (2007) (exploring this same history); Elizabeth Reilly, The Union as It Wasn't
and the Constitution as It Isn't: Section Five and Altering the Balance of Powers, 42 AKRON
L. REV. 1081, 1091-92 (2009) (noting the Fourteenth Amendment's Framers debated
"whether the Necessary and Proper Clause already gave Congress sufficient power to
restrict the States through legislation on matters within the scope of the Amendment, or if
Congress needed a direct grant of power to ensure an enumerated power undergirded their
implied powers to legislate with respect to the matters contained in the Amendment").
99. See James Thomas Tucker, Tyranny of the Judiciary: Judicial Dilution of
Consent Under Section 2 of the Voting Rights Act, 7 WM. & MARY BILL RTS. J. 443, 492-94
(1999) (discussing how the Court's history requires a more active Congressional role).
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"appropriate" for "necessary and proper" eludes definitive
statement, substantial evidence traces the substitution to Chief
Justice Marshall's opinion in McCulloch v. Maryland.' In any
event, as David Currie recently observed, "'appropriate' is
surely not a more confining term than 'necessary and
proper.""0 '
Admittedly, in Flores the Court interpreted the Framers'
decision to replace the first draft of the Fourteenth
Amendment-which in a single section empowered Congress to
enact all laws necessary and proper to secure the privileges and
immunities of citizens and the equal protection of the laws-with
the Amendment's final text as reflecting a desire to narrow
congressional authority from a substantive to a remedial one.10
That reading of the history has, however, been subjected to
withering criticism from diverse quarters.'o Moreover, as noted
above, Flores is itself the beginning of the error this essay
highlights.
100. See McCulloch v. Maryland, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 316, 423 (1819) (discussing how
the necessity of a measure though less apparent is still appropriate and thus not for the
judiciary to question). For a compelling presentation of the legislative history supporting
this view, see Evan H. Caminker, "Appropriate" Means-Ends Constraints on Section 5
Powers, 53 STAN. L. REV. 1127, 1159-65 (2001). See also Balkin, supra note 12, at 6, 10-14,50
(asserting that the use of the term "appropriate" by the Framers of the Reconstruction
Amendments reflected their assumption that the McCulloch test would apply to those
Amendments).
101. David P. Currie, The Reconstruction Congress, 75 U. CHI. L. REV. 383, 463
(2008). See also Caminker, supra note 100, at 1133 ("Section 5 provides Congress with the
same capacious discretion to select among various means to achieving legitimate ends as
does Article I as construed in McCulloch v. Maryland.").
102. City of Boerne v. Flores, 521 U.S. 507, 520-24 (1997).
103. See David Cole, The Value of Seeing Things Differently: Boerne v. Flores and
Congressional Enforcement of the Bill of Rights, 1997 SUP. CT. REV. 31, 59-72 (noting
that "the remedial/substantive distinction" proved difficult to draw and was eventually
abandoned "for a more deferential approach that left Congress substantial leeway in
determining what conduct affects interstate commerce and requires regulation");
Robert J. Kaczorowski, Popular Constitutionalism Versus Justice In Plainclothes:
Reflections From History, 73 FORDHAm L. REV. 1415, 1438 (2005) ("[Tlhe Supreme Court
curtailed constitutional and legislative protections of constitutional rights that
Reconstruction Congresses adopted."); Michael W. McConnell, Institutions and
Interpretation: A Critique of City of Boerne v. Flores, 111 HARV. L. REV. 153, 189-92
(1997) (stating that the Flores decision "invites the performance of unorthodox roles"
for legislatures and courts). But see MARCI A. HAMILTON, GOD VS. THE GAVEL: RELIGION
AND THE RULE OF LAW 227-37 (2005) (arguing the Court only struck down "the most
outrageous reaches for federal power, including the Religious Freedom Restoration
Act"); Marci A. Hamilton & David Schoenbrod, The Reaffirmation of Proportionality
Analysis Under Section 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment, 21 CARDOZO L. REV. 469, 487-91
(1999) (arguing that the view that "the Boerne Court overturned the 'will of the people'"
is incorrect and advocating proportionality review by the Court (quoting McConnell,
supra, at 168).
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B. History
Reconstruction historiography is notoriously contentious.'0 4
One of the few matters on which the rival camps agree, however,
is that the Framers of the Thirteenth, Fourteenth, and Fifteenth
Amendments did not trust the Supreme Court to provide
adequate protection to the freedmen.' It was for this reason that
each of these Amendments contained provisions expressly
granting enforcement authority to Congress.06
Indeed, in one leading theory of the time, the hegemony of
"the Slave Power" in the South, and hence the horrors of the Civil
War itself, directly resulted from Congress's inability to enforce
the individual rights already guaranteed by the antebellum
Constitution.' 7 John Bingham, a Republican Representative from
Ohio and the principal author of the first Section of the
Fourteenth Amendment, believed as much.o' In keeping with
antislavery constitutionalism,'"o Bingham thought that the
Privileges and Immunities Clause of Article IV, Section 2 already
forbade the state governments from invading the personal rights
of national citizenship."o According to this view, the antebellum
Constitution's only, albeit nearly fatal, deficiency was that the
104. See generally ERIC FONER, RECONSTRUCTION: AMERICA'S UNFINISHED
REVOLUTION: 1863-1877, xix-xxvii (1988) (analyzing accounts of Reconstruction history
to provide "a coherent, comprehensive modem account of Reconstruction"); Randall
Kennedy, Reconstruction and the Politics of Scholarship, 98 YALE L.J. 521, 523-29 (1989)
(reviewing FONER, supra).
105. See, e.g., Rebecca E. Zietlow, Juriscentrism and the Original Meaning of Section
Five, 13 TEMP. POL. & CIV. RTs. L. REV. 485, 506 (2004) (discussing Congress's distrust in
the sufficient enforcement of the Reconstruction Amendments by the federal courts).
106. See id. (stating that Congress's enforcement authority largely resulted from
Congress's distrust in the sufficient enforcement of the Reconstruction Amendments in
the court system).
107. See Rebecca E. Zietlow, Congressional Enforcement of Civil Rights and John
Bingham's Theory of Citizenship, 36 AKRON L. REV. 717, 720, 730, 733 (2003) (discussing
congressional debates on the meaning of citizenship and individual rights during and
before the Civil War).
108. Bryan H. Wildenthal, Nationalizing the Bill of Rights: Revisiting the Original
Understanding of the Fourteenth Amendment in 1866-67, 68 OHIO ST. L.J. 1509, 1532
(2007).
109. See generally WILLIAM M. WIECEK, THE SOURCES OF ANTISLAVERY
CONSTITUTIONALISM IN AMERICA, 1760-1848 (1977) (discussing the origins and
development of antislavery constitutionalism).
110. See Richard L. Aynes, On Misreading John Bingham and the Fourteenth
Amendment, 103 YALE L.J. 57, 70 (1993) (distinguishing between "citizens," "state
citizens," and "citizens of the United States" in a reading of the Equal Protection Clause).
That the Court had repeatedly rejected this view of Article IV and the Bill of Rights only
provided Bingham (and other Framers of the Reconstruction Amendments) that much
more reason to doubt the efficacy of judicial enforcement standing unaided. See id. at 72-74
(discussing Bingham's objective to overcome the effects of the Court's decisions by
adopting the Fourteenth Amendment).
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Constitution did not grant to Congress the power to enforce that
guarantee (which the Court had misunderstood or willfully
declined to enforce)."' It was to fill this gap that Bingham
introduced before both the House of Representatives and the
Joint Committee on Reconstruction his proposal for what was to
become the Fourteenth Amendment.112  Abolitionist
dissatisfaction with the Court's failure to discipline the states
was severely exacerbated by the Court's infamous affront to the
power of Congress in Dred Scott v. Sanford."'
Nor did Republican suspicions end with the 1864 death of
Chief Justice Taney. With the appointment of Chief Justice
Salmon P. Chase as Chief Justice Taney's successor, five of the
ten Justices were Lincoln appointees." Even so, congressional
leaders remained wary of the Court, which itself remained wary
of a "radical" approach toward the former Confederate states."
None of the Justices were as vigorously nationalist as the leaders
of Congressional Reconstruction.116 In 1866 the Court held, in Ex
111. See id. at 71-72 (explaining that "the absence of an express clause granting
Congress enforcement authority meant. .. no remedy was available when the states
breached" Article IV, Section 2 of the Constitution).
112. See id. at 67, 71-73 (noting Bingham's concern that Congress did not have the
power to enforce the Bill of Rights when he proposed the new Amendment).
113. Dred Scott v. Sandford, 60 U.S. (19 How.) 393, 464 (1856) (Nelson, J., concurring
in the judgment); see Garrett Epps, Interpreting the Fourteenth Amendment: Two Don'ts
and Three Dos, 16 WM. & MARY BILL RTS. J. 433, 455-56 (2007) (observing that the
majority of the Thirty-Ninth Congress had little reason to trust the federal courts given
that "the most significant use of the power of constitutional judicial review in the Justices'
lifetimes had been the grotesquely pro-slavery decision in Dred Scott v. Sandford");
Michael W. McConnell, Originalism and the Desegregation Decisions, 81 VA. L. REV. 947,
1113 (1995) ("It was not unnatural that (the supporters of Reconstruction] would be
skeptical of reliance on the institution that had produced Dred Scott v. Sanford. . .. ");
Emily Field Van Tassel, Resignations and Removals: A History of Federal Judicial
Service--and Disservice-1789-1992, 142 U. PA. L. REV. 333, 376 (1993) (noting that
"[n]ewspaper commentary of the time expressed the extreme congressional distrust of the
Supreme Court").
114. KENNETH JOST, THE SuPREME COURT A TO Z 556 (4th ed. 2007). In 1863,
Congress increased the number of Justices from nine to ten; in 1866, it reduced the
number to seven; in 1869, it increased the number to nine, where it has remained ever
since. See Barry Friedman, The History of the Countermajoritarian Difficulty, Part II:
Reconstruction's Political Court, 91 GEO. L.J. 1, 38-40 (2002) (describing the fluctuations
in the number of Supreme Court Justices between 1863 and 1869).
115. See Zietlow, supra note 105, at 506-09 (describing Congress's efforts to
legislatively effectuate the Reconstruction Amendments despite the Court's holdings in
the Slaughter-House Cases and the Civil Rights Cases which "significantly limited the
scope of the Fourteenth Amendment, and of Congress' power to enforce that
Amendment").
116. See Robert N. Clinton, A Mandatory View of Federal Court Jurisdiction: Early
Implementation of and Departures from the Constitutional Plan, 86 COLUM. L. REV. 1515,
1608-09 (1986) (contrasting the political and legal viewpoints of the Court's members to
the "views of the vigorous nationalists who controlled the Reconstruction Congresses").
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Parte Milligan,"' that suspected traitors could not be tried by
military commission in Indiana, where civil courts remained
open."' Many Republicans saw in the ruling a sign that the Court
would in due course invalidate military reconstruction."9 This
tension between Congress and the Court eventually produced
history's most salient clashes between the power of judicial
review and Congress's power over the Supreme Court's
jurisdiction. In the first case, 2 o involving a Mississippi firebrand
jailed for inflammatory editorials challenging the validity of the
reconstruction government, Congress repealed the statutory
provision authorizing his appeal to the Supreme Court for the
express purpose of preventing the "calamity" of a judicial decision
against the constitutionality of military reconstruction. 2 ' Less
than three years later, in United States v. Klein, the Court
rebuffed Congress's effort to dictate the outcome of a case
concerning the scope of President Johnson's power to pardon
former confederates.122
In short, the Reconstruction Congresses were engaged in a
longstanding power struggle with the Supreme Court. This
context makes it highly unlikely that they entrusted the
execution of the then highly controversial policies embodied in
the Era's three constitutional amendments solely, or even
primarily, to the courts. But this conclusion need not rely on
inference. The Framers of the constitutional amendments said as
much at the time. In presenting the Amendment, a product of the
Joint Committee on Reconstruction, to the Senate, Senator Jacob
Howard stated that Section 5 placed on Congress "[the] power
and . .. duty" of enforcing its substantive guarantees.12 Another
117. Ex parte Milligan, 71 (4 Wall.) U.S. 2 (1866). The Court announced its
(unanimous) decision in April of 1866 but did not release its opinions until December of
that year. See Alpheus Thomas Mason, Inter Arma Silent Leges: Chief Justice Stone's
Views, 69 HARV. L. REV. 806, 819 n.52 (1956).
118. Milligan, 71 U.S. at 121-22.
119. See Michael Les Benedict, Salmon P. Chase and Constitutional Politics, 22 LAW
& SOC. INQUIRY 459, 473 (1997) (discussing Court challenges to Reconstruction
congressional policies and congressional counter-attacks aimed at depriving the Court of
jurisdiction over cases that threatened those Reconstruction policies).
120. Exparte McCardle, 74 (7 Wall.) U.S. 506 (1868).
121. See William W. Van Alstyne, A Critical Guide to Ex Parte McCardle, 15 ARIz. L.
REV. 229, 236-39 (1973) (discussing historical background).
122. United States v. Klein, 80 U.S. (13 Wall.) 128, 146 (1871).
123. See Goodwin Liu, Education, Equality, and National Citizenship, 116 YALE L.J.
330, 365-66 (2006) (quoting CONG. GLOBE, 39th Cong., 1st Sess. 2768 (1866) (statement of
Sen. Howard)); see also WILLIAM E. NELSON, THE FOURTEENTH AMENDMENT: FROM
POLITICAL PRINCIPLE TO JUDICIAL DOCTRINE 122 (1988) (observing that the Framers of
the Fourteenth Amendment expected "Congress rather than the courts [to] be the
principal enforcer of section one").
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member of the Joint Committee, Representative Roscoe
Conkling, insisted that Congress was vested with authority to
interpret the Amendment's vague commitments as well. As he
explained, all questions "arising upon the construction" of the
Amendment would be resolved by Congress, adding almost as an
afterthought that "perhaps . .. the courts" would assist in the
effort."' Congress's proper role in identifying the rights protected
by the substantive sections of the Reconstruction Amendments is
debatable.'2 5 However that debate is resolved, the history
indisputably reaffirms what the text seems to say-that the
principal responsibility for carrying these Amendments' promises
to fruition was committed to Congress.
C. Other Enumerated Powers
The Court's extensive federalism jurisprudence supplies a
model for judicial review of legislation enforcing the
Reconstruction Amendments. Existing scholarship persuasively
argues that Congress should enjoy at least "the same capacious
discretion to select among various means to achieving legitimate
ends" when enforcing the Reconstruction Amendments as it does
under "Article I as construed in McCulloch."'2 6 A review of
modern cases in the latter context shows that the Court has
there disclaimed any significant role in second-guessing
Congress's judgment about the extent of an admitted evil.'27 This
experience teaches that the Court should likewise refrain from
rulings that would in effect require Congress to tolerate any
deviation from the utopian vision of the Thirteenth, Fourteenth,
and Fifteenth Amendments.
Countless cases support the proposition that it is not for the
Court to question Congress's judgment about the seriousness of a
perceived problem provoking a federal legislative response, but
124. CONG. GLOBE, 39th Cong., 1st Sess. 358 (1866) (statement of Rep. Conkling). See
also supra note 103 (discussing Congress's role in the interpretation of the Fourteenth
Amendment).
125. See infra notes 180-82 and accompanying text (stating that Flores limited
Congress's role to enforcing the Fourteenth Amendment while having no role in
interpreting what substantive rights the Fourteenth Amendment guarantees).
126. Caminker, supra note 100, at 1133. See also Richard E. Levy, An Unwelcome
Stranger: Congressional Individual Rights Power and Federalism, 44 U. KAN. L. REV. 61,
87 (1995) ("There is no compelling reason to approach the interpretation of the scope of
federal power under the Reconstruction Amendments differently from the interpretation
of other federal powers.").
127. See, e.g., Perez v. United States, 402 U.S. 146, 154 (1971) ("Where the class of
activities is regulated and that class is within the reach of federal power, the courts have
no power to excise, as trivial, individual instances of the class.") (internal quotation marks
omitted).
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the font of this authority is, of course, McCulloch itself.'2 8 Chief
Justice Marshall there admonished that, were the Court "to
undertake . .. to inquire into the degree of [a law's] necessity," it
would "pass the line which circumscribes the judicial
department, and . .. tread on legislative ground," a power to
which the Court "disclaim[ed] all pretensions.""' Instead, the
Court would invalidate federal statutes only if Congress were to
"adopt measures which are prohibited by the constitution" or,
"under the pretext of executing its powers, pass laws for the
accomplishment of objects not entrusted to the [central]
government."' So long, however, as Congress acted in
furtherance of the objects committed by the Constitution to the
national authority, the Court would defer to the judgment of
Congress that the perceived impediment to those ends was
substantial and that the remedy chosen would effectuate a cure.
The Court has, with rare exceptions, honored this counsel in
cases challenging congressional exercise of Article I powers. The
Court's modem Commerce Clause jurisprudence, for example,
provides numerous examples of judicial deference to often
implicit determinations that a perceived problem was sufficiently
serious to merit a national legislative solution.'' Especially
illustrative is the Court's recent ruling in Gonzales v. Raich.'32
Angel Raich and Diane Monson filed suit in a U.S. district
court seeking a declaration that the federal Controlled
Substances Act (CSA) could not be applied to their cultivation
and possession of marijuana for personal medical use, as
permitted by the law of their home state, California.'3 3 For
several years prior to filing suit, Raich and Monson, both of
whom suffered from what the Court termed a "variety of serious
medical conditions," had regularly consumed marijuana to treat
some of their numerous, severe symptoms.'3 4 Their consumption
of the drug conformed with both the advice of their licensed,
board-certified family physicians and to California's
128. McCulloch v. Maryland, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 316, 423 (1819).
129. Id.
130. Id. (emphasis added).
131. See, e.g., Perez, 402 U.S. at 154-55 (accepting Congress's determination that
extortionate credit transactions, though purely intrastate in nature, affect interstate
commerce).
132. Gonzales v Raich, 545 U.S. 1, 17-19 (2005).
133. Id. at 6-8. Raich and Monson also argued that applying the CSA to their
conduct violated the Due Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment, the Ninth and Tenth
Amendments, and the doctrine of medical necessity. Id. at 8. The Supreme Court
expressly declined to reach the substantive due process and medical necessity arguments.
Id. at 33.
134. Id. at 6-7.
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Compassionate Use Act."' As the Court acknowledged, their
physicians had exhausted all alternative treatments before
concluding that marijuana alone provided effective relief.13 6
Perhaps most importantly, Raich and Monson did everything
they could to distance the marijuana they consumed from any
activity even arguably economic in nature."' Moreover, they also
assiduously avoided any connection between their marijuana and
the world outside California."8 For example, the cannabis Raich
used was "grown using only soil, water, nutrients, equipment,
supplies, and lumber originating from or manufactured within
California.""' The link between their possession of marijuana for
medical purposes and Congress's power to regulate interstate
commerce was, at best, highly attenuated.
Nevertheless, the Court sustained the law as applied to
them. Tacitly acknowledging that respondents' conduct was
neither "commerce" nor of an interstate nature, the Court
reasoned that an all-encompassing, prophylactic prohibition on
possession anywhere for any purpose was a necessary and proper
tool in the struggle to eradicate the interstate market for the drug
for recreational purposes. 4 o To satisfy judicial scrutiny, it was
sufficient that "Congress could reasonably conclude that its
objective of prohibiting marijuana from the interstate market
could be undercut if [respondents'] activities were excepted from
its general scheme of regulation."4' When, however, the
relatively trivial amount of medical marijuana permitted by
California law is compared to the enormous pre-existing illegal
interstate trade in the drug, the former is revealed to be but a
tiny tail on a mammoth dog. 42
That the Court permitted the former to wag the latter
underscores the wide latitude Congress ordinarily enjoys in its
135. Id.
136. Id. at 7; Brief for Respondents at 4-5, Raich v. Gonzales, 545 U.S. 1 (2005)
(No. 03-1454) [hereinafter Brief for Raich].
137. Brief for Raich, supra note 136, at 24-25.
138. Id. at 6.
139. Id. "Monson's cultivation of marijuana [was] similarly local in nature." Id.
(internal quotation marks omitted).
140. Raich, 545 U.S. at 17-22; see id. at 40-42 (Scalia, J., concurring) ("That simple
possession is a non-economic activity is immaterial to whether it can be prohibited as a
necessary part of a larger regulation.").
141. Id. at 42 (internal quotation marks omitted).
142. See id. at 64 (Thomas, J., dissenting) (noting the existence of a "multibillion-dollar
interstate market for marijuana" and therefore finding it "difficult to see how this vast
market could be affected by diverted medical cannabis, let alone in a way that makes
regulating intrastate medical marijuana obviously essential to controlling the interstate
drug market").
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choice of means, including prophylactic prohibitions, when in
pursuit of a constitutionally legitimate end.'43 And while Raich
provides a particularly stark and recent illustration of the
Court's deference to Congress's assessment of a problem and
choice of remedies, it is by no means atypical. Rather, such
generous indulgence is the rule not only in the context of the
Commerce Clause,'" but also when Congress exercises its other
Article I powers,4 4 even when acting directly on the state
governments.'46 The Court's decisions in United States v. Lopez"'
and United States v. Morrison148 are not to the contrary, as they
rested on categorical determinations that the very objects of the
invalidated laws were non-economic and therefore outside the
ambit of Congress's Commerce Clause authority. That Congress
143. Indeed, meaningful pretext review in Raich arguably would have disclosed
Congress's actual end as a constitutionally suspect one. As Justice Thomas argued, the
connection between respondents' conduct and the purported goal of suppressing interstate
commerce in marijuana was so attenuated as to suggest that Congress's real purpose was
"to exercise police power of the sort reserved to the States in order to eliminate even the
intrastate possession and use of marijuana." Id. at 64; see id. at 66 (observing that the
majority's generous construction of the Commerce and Necessary and Proper Clauses
threatened to convert them into tools for the accomplishment of ends not provided to the
federal government).
144. See, e.g., Perez v. United States, 402 U.S. 146, 146-47, 154-55 (1971)
(sustaining a federal criminal prohibition on extortionate credit transactions as a valid
exercise of Congress's Commerce Clause authority); Katzenbach v. McClung, 379 U.S.
294, 302-04 (1964) (sustaining the application of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 to a
family-owned restaurant as within congressional power under the Commerce Clause);
Wickard v. Filburn, 317 U.S. 111, 127-29 (1942) (sustaining federal regulation of the
amount of wheat grown for home consumption). See generally Steven G. Calabresi, "A
Government of Limited and Enumerated Powers": In Defense of United States v. Lopez, 94
MICH. L. REV. 752, 752 (1995) (describing the Court as "being 'asleep at the constitutional
switch' for [the] more than fifty years" that elapsed between the decisions upholding New
Deal legislation and United States v. Lopez); Lino A. Graglia, United States v. Lopez:
Judicial Review Under the Commerce Clause, 74 TEx. L. REV. 719, 746 (1996) (concluding
that since the New Deal, "the Court ha[s] engaged in only pretend review" under the
Commerce Clause).
145. See, e.g., Woods v. Cloyd W. Miller Co., 333 U.S. 138, 141 (1948) (sustaining a
1947 Act of Congress freezing rents at war-time levels as a valid exercise of the war
power); Nigro v. United States, 276 U.S. 332, 336-38, 354 (1928) (upholding the Harrison
Anti-Narcotic Act, which in effect criminalized the distribution of morphine, as an
appropriate exercise of Congress's power to tax).
146. See, e.g., Reno v. Condon, 528 U.S. 141, 143 (2000) (discussing the regulation of
the disclosure of information contained in state motor vehicle department records); South
Dakota v. Dole, 483 U.S. 203, 205, 212 (1987) (highway funds conditioned on a state's
enactment of a prohibition on the purchase of alcohol by persons less than twenty-one
years old); Garcia v. San Antonio Metro. Transit Auth., 469 U.S. 528, 554 (1985)
(application of Fair Labor Standards Act to municipal transit employees).
147. See United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549, 561 (1995) (holding that the terms of
the Gun-Free School Zones Act of 1990 have "nothing to do with 'commerce' or any sort of
economic enterprise").
148. See United States v. Morrison, 529 U.S. 598, 613 (2000) ("Gender-motivated
crimes of violence are not, in any sense of the phrase, economic activity.").
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enjoys such latitude in the exercise of its Article I powers
suggests that it should be accorded at least as much discretion
when enforcing the Reconstruction Amendments. Congress
should be permitted to discharge its constitutional duty to
eradicate voting discrimination with at least the same relentless
zeal it brings to, for example, the war on drugs.
D. Institutional (In)Competence
Chief Justice Marshall concluded that the federal judiciary
ought not to inquire into "the degree of [a law's] necessity"'4 9
because such inquiry was inherently more legislative than
judicial. As usual, he was right. Such matters are more
appropriately committed to Congress because it enjoys greater
capacity to resolve them properly. Congress is far better able to
inform itself about the scope, nature, and seriousness of existing
social evils. As importantly, it far better reflects society's
comparative commitments to the conflicting values implicated by
a choice as to whether, and if so to what extent, law should be
employed to achieve a vision of justice.
1. (In)Capacity. Questions about the severity of an
admitted social problem are quintessential questions of
legislative fact. "Legislative facts" are facts of general
applicability that do (or do not) support the public policy
judgment leading to the enactment of legislation.5 o At least since
the early 1940s, commentators and jurists have distinguished
legislative from adjudicative facts, which concern the application
of a general rule to the unique, concrete circumstances of a
particular dispute."'
Courts are notoriously bad at resolving questions of
legislative fact.' The principal purpose of the judiciary, at least
historically, has been to resolve discrete disputes between
particular parties, and the institution is structured to that end.5
149. McCulloch v. Maryland, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 316, 423 (1819).
150. 2 KENNETH CULP DAVIS, ADMINISTRATIVE LAW TREATISE § 15.03 (1958).
151. See, e.g., Kenneth L. Karst, Legislative Facts in Constitutional Litigation, 1960
SUP. CT. REV. 75, 77 & n.9 ("The phrase [legislative facts'] virtually belongs to Professor
Kenneth C. Davis." (citing DAVIS, supra note 150, § 15.03)).
152. See McCulloch, 17 U.S. at 423 (stating that the Court "disclaims all pretensions
to" the power of "tread[ing] on legislative ground"); A. Christopher Bryant, The Empirical
Judiciary, 25 CONST. COMMENT. 467, 472-73 (2009) (reviewing DAVID L. FAIGMAN,
CONSTITUTIONAL FICTIONS: A UNIFIED THEORY OF CONSTITUTIONAL FACTS (2008)).
153. Michael Abramowicz & Thomas B. Colby, Notice-and-Comment Judicial
Decisionmaking, 76 U. CHI. L. REV. 965, 979 (2009) ("[Dletermining the rights of the many
on the basis of a lawsuit between the few can produce bad results.").
6052010]
HeinOnline  -- 47 Hous. L. Rev. 605 2010-2011
HOUSTON LAW REVIEW
The adversarial system assumes that the contest between the
parties will supply appropriate incentives for the discovery and
disclosure of the most pertinent information and persuasive
arguments, unless and until the cost of doing so exceeds either
party's estimation of the dispute's value (or either party's ability
to pay).15 4 Much can and has been said on behalf of this structure
as an engine for just resolution of particularized controversies."'
But it is ill-suited to ensuring the appropriate investigation
and consideration of such issues as the scope of racial
discrimination in voting across the United States. However
strong the incentives of Northwest Austin Municipal Utility
District Number One to ascertain the progress, or lack thereof,
the country has made towards eradicating unconstitutional
voting discrimination, those incentives do not approach those of
the whole nation. Nor do courts or the litigants appearing before
them have anything like the resources Congress routinely
employs in investigating such questions.'56 In the rare cases in
which the prestige of Congress proves inadequate to draw forth
voluntary production of information, resort may be had to its
virtually unlimited investigatory powers, including compulsory
157process.
Whereas the judicial process is designed to discover the
details of discrete disputes, the deliberative nature of legislative
bodies enhances their ability to determine legislative facts.'
Ordinarily a record is built first in parallel committees in both
chambers, often over many years. That process is not merely
open. It is self-consciously orchestrated to stimulate public
consideration of and ultimately involvement in a national debate,
154. DAVID J.A. CAIRNS, ADVOCACY AND THE MAKING OF THE ADVERSARIAL CRIMINAL
TRIAL 1800-1865, at 124 (1998).
155. But see T.H. WHITE, THE ONCE AND FUTURE KING 220 (1940) (analogizing the
adversarial system to trial by combat).
156. MORTON ROSENBERG, INVESTIGATIVE OVERSIGHT: AN INTRODUCTION TO THE
LAw, PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE OF CONGRESSIONAL INQUIRY 1 (1995) (discussing
Congress's inquisitorial powers).
157. Id.; see, e.g., Eastland v. U.S. Servicemen's Fund, 421 U.S. 491, 504 (1975)
(reaffirming that the issuing of subpoenas is a legitimate congressional investigative
power); Watkins v. United States, 354 U.S. 178, 187 (1957) ("It is unquestionably the duty
of all citizens to cooperate with the Congress in its efforts to obtain the facts needed for
intelligent legislative action."); McGrain v. Daugherty, 273 U.S. 135, 173-75 (1927)
(holding that Congress has not only its enumerated powers but "such auxiliary powers as
are necessary and appropriate" to carry out its enumerated functions, including the power
of compulsion).
158. Washington v. Glucksberg, 521 U.S. 702, 787 (1997) (Souter, J., concurring in
judgment) ("[Flacts necessary to resolve the controversy are not readily ascertainable
through the judicial process; but they are more readily subject to discovery through
legislative factfinding . . . .").
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which in a feedback loop further informs and influences members
of Congress. Perhaps most significantly, one aspect of the
representation elected representatives provide their constituents
is to reflect in miniature their constituents' experiences,
interests, and values.' To be sure, the reflection is an imperfect
and distorted one.6 o But it would be hard to find a less
representative body than the federal judiciary, in general, and
the U.S. Supreme Court in particular. Exacerbating the rarified
nature of the Justices' backgrounds, 6 ' their extraordinary
isolation and resulting insulation from the lives of most ordinary
citizens leaves them exceptionally poor barometers of present
social realities. By contrast, the nature of elected office compels
legislators to preserve channels of communication and
opportunities for interaction with their constituents.' The point
of this comparison is not that no separation exists between the
lives of elected representatives and those they represent, but
rather merely that institutional forces preserve a far more
intimate connection than would be conceivable for Article III
judges, especially those serving in the highly secluded setting of
the nation's highest court.
The energy of congressional mechanisms for the reception of
legislative facts is underscored by the poverty of judicial
counterparts. A primary medium for injecting public information
and opinion into litigation is the amicus brief-a tool of
indeterminate impact employed in a scandalously undisciplined
fashion.'63 More generally, as recent decisions have made only too
159. See generally HANNA FENICHEL PITKIN, THE CONCEPT OF REPRESENTATION 60-91
(1967) (discussing descriptive representational theory).
160. See, e.g., David S. Broder, Gingrich's Heresy, WASH. POST, Nov. 14, 1995, at A19
(noting that representatives are heavily influenced by special interest groups).
161. All nine sitting Justices received their law degrees from three northeastern, Ivy
League law schools. The Justices are not even representative of the legal profession, itself
hardly representative of the population at large. See Adam Liptak, A Well-Traveled Path
from Ivy League to Supreme Court, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 7, 2010, at A15 (noting the Ivy
League educational background of the Supreme Court); cf Lino A. Graglia, Lawrence v.
Texas: Our Philosopher-King's Adopt Libertarianism as Our Official National Philosophy
and Reject Traditional Morality as a Basis for Law, 65 OHIO ST. L.J. 1139, 1141 (2004)
("Supreme Court Justices are almost always themselves products of elite academia and
members of the cultural elite, seeking its approval and sharing its deep distrust of the
mass of their fellow citizens.").
162. Last summer's contentious town-hall meetings on healthcare reform-see Ian
Urbina, Beyond Beltway, Health Debate Turns Hostile, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 8, 2009, at Al,
describing how divisions over the legislation resulted in explosive town-hall situations-are
merely the most vivid, recent illustrations that members of Congress expose themselves
to public expression in ways unimaginable for a Supreme Court Justice.
163. See DAVID L. FAIGMAN, CONSTITUTIONAL FICTIONS: A UNIFIED THEORY OF
CONSTITUTIONAL FACTS 97-98 (2008) ("[Clourts routinely accept amicus briefs chock-full
of factual assertions from interested parties who might, or might not, have expertise on
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clear," the Supreme Court "has been inconsistent and result
oriented in its approach to social fact-finding."165 The point is not
that the judiciary ought never decide issues of legislative fact,
but merely that its capacity to do so is grossly underdeveloped
when compared to that of Congress.
2. (II)Legitimacy. Questions of legislative fact often involve
normative considerations. Any evaluation of the present severity
of racial discrimination in voting, for example, depends upon an
implicit judgment about just how detestable and destructive the
practice is. Ultimately these kinds of determinations, while of a
constitutional dimension, are more political than legal. In any
polity committed to popular government, the people making them
must both be vested with representative authority and
accountable to the citizens they represent. Of course, neither of
these things can be said about federal judges.
To be sure, constitutionalism inherently places some
fundamental normative commitments outside the scope of ordinary
politics. As to these commitments, courts insulated from political
pressure can and do serve as an essential check on members of
Congress, whose very accountability to the public at times tempts
them to betray those commitments to expediency, real or
perceived.'" No doubt Justice Thomas believes that invalidating
the-in his view-unnecessary renewal of the now-gratuitously
insulting preclearance requirement would vindicate the
Constitution's commitment to federalism principles."' Yet, as he
has in other circumstances been among the first to note, the
Court properly plays this role only where the championed
normative principal is firmly rooted in the Constitution's text or
the subject."); Paul M. Collins Jr., Friends of the Court: Examining the Influence of
Amicus Curiae Participation in U.S. Supreme Court Litigation, 38 LAW & SoC'Y REV. 807,
809-10 (2004) (noting that because the Court "operate[s] in an environment of incomplete
information," the Justices seek information through public opinion and amicus curiae
briefs).
164. See, e.g., Gonzales v. Carhart, 550 U.S. 124 (2007).
165. John 0. McGinnis & Charles W. Mulaney, Judging Facts like Law, 25 CONST.
COMMENT. 69, 72 (2008).
166. See, e.g., LAURENCE H. TRIBE, AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 9-10, 583 (1978)
(asserting that the function of the judicial branch "is to protect dissenters from a
majority's tyranny"). But see, e.g., Barry Friedman, Mediated Popular Constitutionalism,
101 MICH. L. REV. 2596, 2600 (2003) (challenging view that judicial review is
countermajoritarian); Michael J. Klarman, Rethinking the Civil Rights and Civil Liberties
Revolutions, 82 VA. L. REV. 1, 6-7 (1996) ("[T]he Court's capacity to protect minority
rights is more limited than most justices or scholars allow.").
167. See Nw. Austin Mun. Util. Dist. No. One v. Holder, 129 S. Ct. 2504, 2517 (2009)
(Thomas, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part) (stating that Justice Thomas
would forego the avoidance doctrine in holding that section 5 of the Voting Rights Act
exceeded congressional authority).
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history."8 Although the preservation of state autonomy and
authority in most matters was arguably a paramount
consideration of the Constitution of 1860, the Reconstruction
Amendments altered this balance."' And, as discussed above,
nothing in the text or history of those Amendments remotely
suggests that Congress was obliged to tolerate any level of racial
discrimination in voting or any other infringement upon the
individual rights the Amendments empowered Congress to
protect.o In exercising this explicit authority, Congress must as
a practical matter make difficult decisions about when marginal
advancement towards constitutional perfection no longer justifies
the commitment of additional scarce resources or the intrusion
upon competing values such as state autonomy. The Court,
however, has no legitimate claim to a power to dismiss any
violations of the Constitution as too trivial for congressional
notice.
3. Appropriate Limits. A likely response to the argument so
far is that it accords Congress so much discretion as to effectively
free it from the constraints imposed by the Constitution's system
of enumerated powers. As a general matter this concern is a
grave one."' But it is misplaced here.
Congress's power to pursue perfect compliance with the
Reconstruction Amendments is subject to significant limits
inapplicable to its other heads of authority. Most importantly,
the Enforcement Clauses of the Reconstruction Amendments
authorize only those laws calculated to enforce the individual
rights their substantive sections protect.'72 The power to enforce
168. See Clark v. Martinez, 543 U.S. 371, 395-97 (2005) (Thomas, J., dissenting)
(explaining the Court's traditional approach to interpreting constitutionally ambiguous
statutes in a manner that preserves constitutional integrity).
169. See Fitzpatrick v. Bitzer, 427 U.S. 445, 455 (1976) (observing that a line of
Supreme Court cases had "sanctioned intrusions by Congress, acting under the Civil War
Amendments, into the judicial, executive, and legislative spheres of autonomy previously
reserved to the States").
170. See, e.g., U.S. CONST. amend. XV, §§ 1-2 ("The right of the citizens of the United
States to vote shall not be denied or abridged by the United States or by any State . . .
(emphasis added).
171. This Author has found fault with interpretations of the Constitution that are
insufficiently protective of the reserved powers of the states. See generally McAFFEE,
BYBEE & BRYANT, supra note 30, at 160 ("According to this interpretation of the Tenth
Amendment, it would provide no constitutional protection to the reserved powers of the
states. .. ."); A. Christopher Bryant, The Third Death of Federalism, 17 CORNELL J.L. &
PUB. POL'Y 101, 122-23, 151-52 (2007).
172. City of Boerne v. Flores, 521 U.S. 507, 527 (1997) (explaining that Congress has
the power to enforce the Reconstruction Amendments, but not to substantively define the
right).
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the Thirteenth Amendment is limited by the specificity of its
object-the elimination of slavery and involuntary servitude.'
The Fourteenth and Fifteenth Amendments, focused as they are
on state action, simply have no relevance to the great range of
private conduct subject to the reserved police powers of the
states.' 4 This narrow scope contrasts starkly with the more
frequently invoked Article I powers, which sweep more broadly.
Even if Congress's power to regulate Commerce, for example, is
limited to activities of an economic nature, that limit excludes
very little in a society so interconnected and commodified as our
own.17 1 In those rare cases concerning solely non-economic
activity,'77 Congress can always avail itself of its power to
condition federal spending and thereby, as a practical matter,
achieve control over the subject."' These and other Article I
powers are limited by no restriction so tight as the requirement
that statutes enforcing the Reconstruction Amendments must
reach only that conduct logically related to ongoing-or
imminently threatened-denials of those constitutional
171provisions' substantive promises.
Under existing jurisprudence, these restrictions impose
especially tight constraints on Congress and subject
173. See U.S. CONST. amend. XIII, § 1 ("Neither slavery nor involuntary
servitude .. . shall exist within the United States .... ).
174. See Lugar v. Edmonson Oil Co., 457 U.S. 922, 936 (1982) (stating that "the
Fourteenth Amendment offers no shield" against private conduct (quoting Jackson v.
Metro. Edison Co., 419 U.S. 345, 349 (1974))); Terry v. Adams, 345 U.S. 461, 473 (1953)
(noting that the Fifteenth Amendment applies only to State action, not to purely private
conduct).
175. Cf United States v. Morrison, 529 U.S. 598, 613 (2000) ("[T]hus far in our
Nation's history our cases have upheld Commerce Clause regulation of intrastate activity
only where that activity is economic in nature.").
176. See Jonathan H. Adler, Is Morrison Dead: Assessing a Supreme Drug (Law)
Overdose, 9 LEWIS & CLARK L. REV. 751, 764 (2005) (observing that, according to the
majority opinion in Gonzales v. Raich, 545 U.S. 1 (2005), "any privately produced item
that can substitute for a commercially produced good is subject to federal control" and
accordingly, "Congressional power knows few limits").
177. See, e.g., Morrison, 529 U.S. at 613 (observing that crimes motivated by gender
were not in any way economic activity).
178. See South Dakota v. Dole, 483 U.S. 203, 207 (1987) (holding that objectives not
within Congress's Article I powers may still "be attained through the use of the spending
power and the conditional grant of federal funds"); see also Richard E. Levy, Federalism:
The Next Generation, 33 LoY. L.A. L. REV. 1629, 1662 (2000) (discussing the breadth of
Congress's conditional spending power); Thomas R. McCoy & Barry Friedman,
Conditional Spending: Federalism's Trojan Horse, 1988 SUP. CT. REV. 85, 126 ("[N]o
regulatory objective realistically is outside Congress's ken through the use of taxation and
spending, and conditions attached to federal grants.").
179. See City of Boerne v. Flores, 521 U.S. 507, 530 (1997) ("While preventive rules
are sometimes appropriate remedial measures, there must be a congruence between the
means used and the ends to be achieved.").
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congressional exercise of the enforcement power to searching
judicial scrutiny. In Flores, the Supreme Court squarely rejected
the claim that the power to enforce the Fourteenth Amendment
accorded Congress any role whatsoever in determining the
contours of the substantive rights the Amendment protects.'s To
be sure, this aspect of Flores has been sharply and widely
criticized,' though it is not without its defenders. 2 But there is
no present need to take sides in this debate. It suffices to observe
that Flores is the law, at least insofar as the Court is
concerned.' 3 So long as this remains the case, Congress's power
to pursue even perfect compliance is subject to judicial scrutiny of
the relation between the means chosen and the end the Justices
regard as constitutionally mandated. What makes Justice
Thomas's opinion in NAMUDNO-and the Court's decisions in
Florida Prepaid, Kimel, and Garrett-so startling is their
acknowledgement that Congress has sought to eliminate conduct
that the Court has or would itself deem unconstitutional.8 4 Yet
Congress's effort is found to be beyond its authority because the
180. Id. at 519-29.
181. See, e.g., McConnell, supra note 103, at 189-92 (criticizing the Court in Flores
for not deferring to the legislature and according RFRA a presumption of
constitutionality); Zietlow, supra note 105, at 490, 506 ("[It is clear that members of that
Congress believed that federal courts' enforcement of the Reconstruction Era
Amendments alone would be insufficient to effectuate the promise of those measures.").
182. See, e.g., Hamilton & Schoenbrod, supra note 103, at 472-73 (recognizing
Congress's authority is limited to enforcement of constitutional provisions).
183. See Dawn E. Johnsen, Functional Departmentalism and Nonjudicial
Interpretation: Who Determines Constitutional Meaning?, 67 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS.
105, 113 & n.36 (2004) ("One of the vibrant constitutional debates at the turn of the
twenty-first century concerns enduring questions about the appropriate role of nonjudicial
entities--especially Congress and the President-in the development of constitutional
meaning."); see also LARRY D. KRAMER, THE PEOPLE THEMSELVES: POPULAR
CONSTITUTIONALISM AND JUDICIAL REVIEW 79-85 (2004) (analyzing the roles of
legislature, President, judiciary, and the people in enforcing the meaning of the
Constitution); Symposium, The People Themselves: Popular Constitutionalism and
Judicial Review, 81 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 809 (2006) (debating "popular constitutionalism");
Symposium, Theories of Taking the Constitution Seriously Outside the Courts, 73
FORDHAM L. REV. 1341 (2005) (discussing constitutional studies through the critiquing of
two books, KRAMER, supra, and LAWRENCE G. SAGER, JUSTICE IN PLAINCLOTHES: A
THEORY OF AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL PRACTICE (2004)). For a comparison of the roles
the Supreme Court and Congress have played in protecting the constitutional rights of
racial minorities, see REBECCA E. ZIETLOW, ENFORCING EQUALITY: CONGRESS, THE
CONSTITUTION, AND THE PROTECTION OF INDIVIDUAL RIGHTS 1-11 (2006) (observing that
congressional construction of the Constitution differs from the courts' interpretation due
to influences from political forces). See also Rebecca E. Zietlow, To Secure These Rights:
Congress, Courts and the 1964 Civil Rights Act, 57 RUTGERS L. REV. 945, 945-46, 951,
988, 991 (2005) (providing examples of protection of minorities by the Court and Congress
in the case of Brown v. Board of Education, 347 U.S. 483 (1954) and the Civil Rights Act).
184. See, e.g., Nw. Austin Mun. Util. Dist. No. One v. Holder, 129 S. Ct. 2504, 2520
(2009) (listing the measures used by Congress to eliminate unconstitutional conduct).
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extent of the conceded violations is not thought by the Justices to
be sufficient to justify the challenged law."' In short, no one
denies the flame, the only question being-is it worth the candle?
Even if, as this essay contends, that question is committed
entirely to Congress, the Court's authority to say which rights
the Reconstruction Amendments do and do not protect is a more
than sufficient tool to keep Congress in check.
Of course this constraint supplements but does not supplant
the political forces that the Court has relied upon, almost
exclusively, to check abuses of Congress's Article I powers. The
structural mechanisms ensuring representation of state
governmental interests in Congressl8 apply with at least as much
force in the arena of civil rights as in that of economic and social
regulation. As Chief Justice Marshall famously observed forty
years before the surrender at Appomattox, the Constitution's
design looks to "[tihe wisdom and the discretion of Congress,
their identity with the people, and the influence which their
constituents possess at elections" to constrain overuse of the
powers granted in Article 1.187
These same considerations, in addition to the supervisory
role for the Court sketched out above, secure against abuse of the
power to compel even perfect compliance with the Reconstruction
Amendments. 8 Indeed, since such legislation almost always
targets the instrumentalities of state and local governments, 18
which have ample formal and informal means to make their
positions known in Congress, the "political safeguards of
185. See id. at 2511 (discussing improved conditions in the area of voting rights).
186. See Garcia v. San Antonio Metro. Transit Auth., 469 U.S. 528, 550-51 (1985)
("[Tihe composition of the Federal Government was designed in large part to protect the
States from overreaching by Congress."); see also JESSE H. CHOPER, JUDICIAL REVIEW AND
THE NATIONAL POLITICAL PROCESS 175-84 (1980) ("[Tlhe Senate ... was that one branch
of the legislature that would function as a representation .. . of the States.... The Lower
house, however, is not itself wholly devoid of mechanisms for state representation."
(alteration in original) (internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting THE FEDERALIST No.
58, at 249 (James Madison) (Charles A. Beard ed., 1948))); D. Bruce La Pierre, The
Political Safeguards of Federalism Redux: Intergovernmental Immunity and the States as
Agents of the Nation, 60 WASH. U. L.Q. 779, 782-84, 800-02, 977 (1982) ("For the first 150
years of our constitutional history, the states exercised significant political
decisionmaking powers."); Herbert Wechsler, The Political Safeguards of Federalism: The
Role of the States in the Composition and Selection of the National Government, 54
COLUM. L. REV. 543, 543-45 (1954) (discussing three ways in which the Constitution
"serve[s] the ends of federalism," including "preserv[ation of] the states as separate
sources of authority").
187. Gibbons v. Ogden, 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) 1, 197 (1824).
188. Id. (discussing political safeguards against abuse of Congress's power).
189. Cf United States v. Morrison, 529 U.S. 598, 621 (2000) (discussing the
requirement of state action for violations of the Fourteenth Amendment).
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federalism""o are more likely to prove effective constraints of
Congress's enforcement authority than of Congress's Article I
powers, which permit direct regulation of private conduct. So too
the Court retains the power to invalidate pretextual assertions of
congressional authority to enforce the Reconstruction
Amendments, at least to the same extent the Court retains that
authority in the context of Congress's Article I powers.
These observations are unlikely to provide much comfort to
those who, along with the present Author, 9' believe that
Congress has largely made a mockery of the enumerated powers
scheme. But virtually all of that damage to our constitutional
structure has been inflicted via the exercise of Article I powers.'
Hence, it is at best misguided to begin efforts to rein Congress in
with an attack on congressional power to enforce the
Reconstruction Amendments. It is as though the Court responded
to a wave of gun violence by banning knives. Indeed, such an
approach seems so obviously misdirected as to invite speculation
as to its origins. Perhaps because of the passage of time or the
Justices' own policy priorities, a majority of the current Court is
willing to acquiesce in the New Deal Era settlement according
Congress plenary power over the nation's economy."' Yet these
same Justices apparently remain recalcitrant in opposition to
what has been identified by some as the "Rights Revolution""
and by others as the "Second Reconstruction,"'9 6 which recognized
190. See generally Larry D. Kramer, Putting the Politics Back into Political
Safeguards of Federalism, 100 COLUM. L. REV. 215, 278-87 (2000) (discussing how the
decentralized party system acts as a political safeguard of American federalism).
191. See City of Boerne v. Flores, 521 U.S. 507, 511, 527 (1996) (providing examples
of the Court invalidating acts of Congress enforcing the Reconstruction Amendments
where the act goes beyond Congress's Section 5 power); McCulloch v. Maryland, 17 U.S.
(4 Wheat.) 316, 423 (1819) (asserting that were Congress to "adopt measures which are
prohibited by the constitution" or "under the pretext of executing its powers, pass laws for
the accomplishment of objects not entrusted to the government," the Court would be
obligated to disregard them as unconstitutional) (emphasis added).
192. See supra note 171 (criticizing interpretations which remove power from the
States).
193. See generally McAFFEE, BYBEE & BRYANT, supra note 30, at 143-62 (discussing
the dramatic expansion of Congress's Article I powers in the twentieth century).
194. See Gonzales v. Raich, 545 U.S. 1, 17-19 (2005) (upholding broad use of
Congress's commerce clause power); see also MCAFFEE, BYBEE & BRYANT, supra note 30,
at 143-75 (describing the Court's historical decisions during the New Deal era).
195. CAsS R. SUNSTEIN, AFTER THE RIGHTS REVOLUTION: RECONCEIVING THE
REGULATORY STATE 24-31 (1990) (describing the Rights Revolution as a period of
expansion of legally protected individual rights by Congress, the President, and the Court).
196. See, e.g., Mark S. Brodin, Reflections on the Supreme Court's 1988 Term: The
Employment Discrimination Decisions and the Abandonment of the Second
Reconstruction, 31 B.C. L. REV. 1, 3, 30 (1989) (proposing "a fundamental change in the
Court's interpretation of Title VII" occurred in the Court's 1988 term); Rebecca E. Zietlow,
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congressional authority of a similar breadth over matters
relating to civil rights. Whether the Court's recent jurisprudence
reflects such an ideological compromise, let alone why the
Justices have reached such an equilibrium,' is well beyond the
scope of this essay. Whatever the explanation, however, the fact
remains that hobbling Congress's power to enforce the
Reconstruction Amendments would be an ill-advised way to
pursue a federalism counter-revolution.
IV. CONCLUSION
In his separate opinion in NAMUDNO, Justice Thomas
asserted that congressional power to enforce the Reconstruction
Amendments via prophylactic legislation did not extend to the
achievement of constitutional perfection.' Insofar as the last
decade is concerned, his statement accurately describes the Court's
case law, albeit in balder terms than had previously been employed.
Perfection is a chimerical goal. Almost by definition its
pursuit calls for efforts disproportionate to the ends to be
achieved. Accordingly, the normative component implicit in
Justice Thomas's descriptive observation-that "[p]erfect
compliance" ought not be "the yardstick for determining whether
Congress has the power to employ broad prophylactic legislation"
to enforce the Reconstruction Amendments-no doubt strikes
most readers as self-evidently true."' Few if any would argue
that even such laudatory goals as eradication of the vestiges of
slavery or elimination of racial barriers to full and meaningful
participation in elections should be pursued without any regard
to the costs or the sacrifice of other important values such as the
constitutional balance of federal and state authority.200 But the
real question is not whether Congress should pursue perfect
compliance heedless of the costs, but which branch of the federal
Free at Last! Anti-Subordination and the Thirteenth Amendment, 90 B.U. L. REV. 255,
287-88 (2010) (discussing the Warren Court's deference to congressional acts enforcing
the Reconstruction Amendments).
197. One recent study suggests that the Voting Rights Act in particular may have
become a favored field for ideological contest. See Adam B. Cox & Thomas J. Miles,
Judging the Voting Rights Act, 108 COLUM. L. REV. 1, 48-49 (2008) (finding that a judge's
race and political leanings relate closely to whether that judge will vote for liability in a
Voting Rights Act case).
198. Nw. Austin Mun. Util. Dist. No. One v. Holder, 129 S. Ct. 2504, 2526 (2009)
(Thomas, J., dissenting).
199. Id.
200. But see Tomiko Brown-Nagin, Elites, Social Movements, and the Law: The Case
of Affirmative Action, 105 COLUM. L. REV. 1436, 1458-62 (2005) (discussing the Coalition
to Defend Affirmative Action, Integration & Immigrant Rights and Fight for Equality by
Any Means Necessary).
614 [ 47:3
HeinOnline  -- 47 Hous. L. Rev. 614 2010-2011
THE PURSUIT OF PERFECTION
government should be the final judge as to when Congress has
done enough.
Contrary to the implicit assumption of the Court's recent
Enforcement Clause cases, the Constitution vests that
determination in Congress alone. The judiciary has no legitimate
role in second-guessing a congressional determination that a
remedy is proportionate to the unconstitutionality thereby
prevented. The text and history of the Reconstruction
Amendments indicate that their best interpretation accords that
discretionary judgment solely to Congress.20 1 Indeed, in the
context of Congress's Article I powers, the Court has repeatedly
acknowledged this to be true, and the case for deference to
Congress is at least as strong with respect to enforcement of the
Reconstruction Amendments. This allocation of power and
responsibility also best accords with considerations of the relative
institutional competence of the federal legislature and judiciary.
Finally, recognition of congressional authority to pursue even
perfect compliance with the commands of the Reconstruction
Amendments poses no grave threat to the balance of power
between the central and state governments, as congressional
exercise of that authority is constrained by other limits both
judicial and political.
In NAMUDNO, the Court deferred to a future day its
decision regarding the constitutionality of the 2006
reauthorization of section 5 of the Voting Rights Act.202 When
that day comes, the Court should seize the opportunity to
acknowledge the power of Congress to pursue perfect
constitutional compliance and thereby rectify the fundamental
error at the heart of its recent Enforcement Clause case law.
201. See sources cited supra note 181.
202. Nw. Austin, 129 S. Ct. at 2508.
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